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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STEVEN FISHER, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
NANETTE FISHER, 
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Cross-Appellee, 
M.DIRKEASTMOND, 
Party-in-interest/Appellee 
and Cross-Appellant. 
Appellate Case No. 20010771-CA 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final order entered August 24,2001, wherein the trial 
court determined that the attorney's lien could attach to the past due child support 
arrearages, but not to the ongoing support, or the child support that would be paid in the < 
future. A copy of the final order has been provided by the State in its Addendum B. 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(6) (Supp. 2000), appeals from final orders from the 
District Court in domestic cases are taken to the Court of Appeals as directed by Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
a. Issues: 
1. Whether District Court's erred in determining that Appellee's attorney's
 { 
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lien attached to child support; • .ip;e that had been assigned to the Office of Recovery 
Services. Whether the trial court correctly interpreted a statute, rule or ordinance is a 
question of law reviewed for correctness. See Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UI 36, 
ir.\<)7,T V M I :j"<il"L - :.•• . • - • 
2. Whether the Court of Appeals should follow its previous ruling in Eastmond v. 
Earl, 912 P.2d 994 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), and is bound to follow the decisions of the Utah 
Supreme 'Court Lundy v. Cuppuccio, 54 I Jtali 120 181 I " 165, ( I Jtali 1919), arid H amj. >tc m 
v. Hampton, 39 P.2d 703 (Utah 1935). Whether the trial court correctly interpreted a 
statute, rule or ordinance is a question of law reviewed for correctness/See Rushton v. 
Salt Lake County, 1999 I J'l ' 36, 11 7, 9 7 7 P.2d 1201. 
} WhrlluT liie I)isti i ::t Coi n !: ei i e i in ilelnminim' llliut an .illornev's llini ni-ni", mil 
attach to future child support that had been assigned to the Office of Recovery Services. 
Whether the trial court correctly interpreted a statute, rule or ordinance is a question of 
law reviewed for correctness. See Rushton i • Salt Lake " G mnty, 1999 [ JT 36, 11 7, 97 7 
P.2dl201. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The following relevant provisions are included in Addendum A. 
a. State Stalutoiy pint ismm. - . _ . ' . . •. 
1. Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 18 [Attainder - Ex post facto 
laws - Impairing contracts.] 
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of 
contracts shall be passed. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 18 
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2. Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-10 (1981). Allowable claims against exempt 
property. 
(1) Notwithstanding other provisions of this chapter, but subject to the 
provisions of the Utah Uniform Consumer Credit Code: 
(a) A creditor may levy against exempt property of any kind to 
enforce a claim for: 
(i) alimony, support, or maintenance; 
(ii) unpaid earnings of up to one monthfs compensation or the 
full-time equivalent of one month's compensation for personal 
services of an employee; or 
(iii) state or local taxes. 
(b) A creditor may levy against exempt property to enforce a claim 
for: 
(i) the purchase price of the property or a loan made for the 
purpose of enabling an individual to purchase the specific 
property used for that purpose; 
(ii) labor or materials furnished to make, repair, improve, 
preserve, store, or transport the specific property; and 
(iii) a special assessment imposed to defray costs of a public 
improvement benefiting the property. 
(2) This section does not affect the right to enforce any statutory lien or 
security interest in exempt property. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-10 (1981). 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-41 (1989). Attorney Lien. 
The compensation of an attorney and counselor for services is governed by 
agreement, express or implied, which is not restrained by law. From the 
commencement of an action, or the service of an answer containing a 
counterclaim or at the time that the attorney and client enter into a written 
or oral employment agreement, the attorney who is so employed has a lien 
upon the client's cause of action or counterclaim, which attaches to any 
settlement, verdict, report, decision, or judgment in the client's favor and to 
the proceeds thereof in whosoever hands they may come, and cannot be 
affected by any settlement between the parties before or after judgment. 
Any written employment agreement shall contain a statement that the 
attorney has a lien upon the client's cause of action or counterclaim. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-41 (1989). 
4. Utah Code Annotated § 38-2-7(2001). Compensation -Attorney's lien. 
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(1) The compensation of an attorney is governed by agreement between the 
attorney and a client, express or implied, which is not restrained by law. 
(2) An attorney shall have a lien for the balance of compensation due from 
a client on any moneys or property owned by the client that is the subject of 
or connected with work performed for the client, including, but not limited 
to: 
(a) any real or personal property that is the subject of or connected 
with the work performed for the client; 
(b) any funds held by the attorney for the client, including any 
amounts paid as a retainer to the attorney by the client; and 
(c) any settlement, verdict, report, decision, or judgment in the 
client's favor in any matter or action in which the attorney assisted, 
including any proceeds derived from the matter or action, whether or 
not the attorney is employed by the client at the time the settlement, 
verdict, report, decision, or judgment is obtained. 
(3) An attorney's lien commences at the time of employment of the 
attorney by the client. 
(4) An attorney may enforce a lien under this section by moving to 
intervene in a pending legal action in which the attorney has assisted or 
performed work, or by filing a separate legal action. An attorney may not 
move to intervene in an action or file a separate legal action to enforce a lien 
before 30 days has expired after a demand for payment has been made and not 
been complied with. 
(5) An attorney may file a notice of lien in a pending legal action in which the 
attorney has assisted or performed work for which the attorney has a lien under 
this section. In addition, an attorney may file a notice of lien with the county 
recorder of the county in which real property that is subject to a lien under this 
section is located. A notice of lien shall include the following: 
(a) the name, address, and telephone number of the attorney claiming the 
lien; 
(b) the name of the client who is the owner of the property subject to the 
lien; 
(c) a verification that the property is the subject of or connected with work 
performed by the attorney for the client and that a demand for payment of 
amounts owed to the attorney for the work has been made and not been 
paid within 30 days of the demand; 
(d) the date the attorney first provided services to the client; 
(e) a description of the property, sufficient for identification; and 
(f) the signature of the lien claimant and an acknowledgment or certificate 
as required under Title 57, Chapter 3, Recording of Documents. 
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(6) Within 30 days after filing the notice of lien, the attorney shall deliver or mail 
by certified mail to the client a copy of the notice of lien. 
(7) Any person who takes an interest in any property, other than real property, 
that is subject to an attorneys lien with actual or constructive knowledge of the 
attorney's lien, takes his or her interest subject to the attorney's lien. An attorney's 
lien on real property has as its priority the date and time when a notice of lien is 
filed with the county recorder of the county in which real properly that is subject 
to a lien under this section is located. 
(8) This section does not alter or diminish in any way an attorney's common law 
retaining lien rights. 
(9) This section does not authorize an attorney to have a lien in the representation 
of a client in a criminal matter or domestic relations matter where a final order of < 
divorce has not been secured unless: 
(a) the criminal matter has been concluded or the domestic relations matter 
has been concluded by the securing of a final order of divorce or the 
attorney/client relationship has terminated; and 
(b) the client has failed to fulfill the client's financial obligation to the < 
attorney. 
b. Federal Statutory provisions: 
1. United States Constitution, Article I, Section 10. [Powers denied the states.] 
[1.] No state shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; grant letters of 
marque and reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make any thing but gold and 
silver coin a tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, as post facto 
law, or law impairing the obligations of contracts, or grant any title of nobility. 
[2.] No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on 
Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its 
inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State 
on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; * 
and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Control of the Congress. 
[3.] No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any duty of Tonnage, 
keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreements or 
Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless 1 
actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay. 
United States Constitution, Article I, Section 10. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. Nature of the case: 
Steven Fisher filed for divorce in the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake 
County in the matter of Steven Wade Fisher v. Nanette Fisher Case No. 984903545. In 
October, 1999, Appellee through his representation of Nanette, obtained a temporary 
order setting the ongoing child support amount and establishing a judgment for past due 
child support. In December 1999, Nanette opened a case with the State of Utah, Office of 
Recovery Services ("the State") in which she requested enforcement of her child support 
order. When the State located an employer for Steven Wade Fisher ("Steven") and began 
withholding for support, Appellee filed a Notice of Attorney's Lien seeking to attach the 
funds collected by the State. The State made a motion to quash the lien. The trial court 
determined that the attorney's lien could attach to the past due child support but not to the 
ongoing support. The State has filed this appeal as to the provisions of the order that 
allow the lien to attach to past due child support and Appellee has filed a cross-appeal as 
to the provisions which prohibit attachment to the ongoing child support. 
b. Course of proceedings: 
Steven Wade Fisher ("Steven") and Nanette Fisher ("Nanette") were married on 
January 12,1991 in Sacramento, California [R. at 1]. During the period of their marriage, 
they had one child, Drew Steven Fisher who was bom July 14, 1991 [R. at 1]. Steven and 
Nanette separated in 1997 and Steven filed a Complaint for divorce on May 13,1998 [R. 
at 1], An answer to the Complaint and a Counterclaim was filed on behalf of Nanette by 
Don L. Bybee on June 18,1998 [R. at 20-23]. Don L. Bybee was suspended from the 
6 
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practice of law and withdrew from the case in January of 1999 [R. at 42]. 
Appellee, as Nanette's new legal counsel, filed a Verified Motion for Temporary 
Orders on March 24, 1999 [R. at 43-52]. On August 9, 1999, Nanette entered into a Legal 
Representation Agreement with Appellee which granted Appellee a lien on all property 
awarded to Nanette [R. at 171-172]. Appellee filed a Supplement to Verified Motion for 
Temporary Orders on August 9,1999, and requested as part of the relief therein that 
Steven be required to pay child support on behalf of Elizabeth Elise Powell who is the 
daughter of Nanette and stepdaughter of Steven [R. at 59-81 ]. 
Commissioner Lisa A. Jones presided at a hearing on the Motion on August 18, 
1999. An order entered from that proceeding in which Steven was required to pay support 
on behalf of Drew and of Elizabeth [R. at 103-108]. That order was supplemented by a 
second order entered October 28,1999 which detailed the amount of the child support 
and the amount of past due child support. [R. at 113-114]. 
Appellee promptly filed a Notice of Attorney's Lien on November 22, 1999 
asserting a lien "upon monies that are to [sic] due Respondent under the Child Support 
Order and Judgment entered by the court on October 28, 1999" [R. at 117]. On December 
13, 1999, Appellee filed a Motion for Finding of Contempt and Judgment [R. at 123-126]. 
In September 2000, the State, on behalf of the Office of Recovery Services, 
intervened in the action to quash the attorney's lien filed by Appellee [R. at 127-130 and 
133-147]. On October 31, 2000, Appellee, Nanette, Steven and Steven's counsel 
executed a Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement which in Paragraph No. 21 
which acknowledged the existence of Appellee's attorney's lien, that the that the State, 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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through the Office of Recovery Services, would continue to collect these child support 
arrearages owed Nanette, and these amounts should be paid over by the Office of 
Recovery Services to Appellee until his attorney's lien has been fully satisfied [R. at 
174-189]. The Stipulation and Property Settlement was submitted to the court on 
December 4,2000 [R. at 174]. Furthermore, the State was not a party to the Stipulation 
[R. at 174-189]. At a hearing on October 4, 2000, Commissioner Susan Bradford 
recommended that the attorneys' lien be quashed and an Order Quashing Attorney Lien 
was entered by the court on February 28,2001 [R. at 280-281]. In the Order Quashing 
Attorney Lien, the basis for such recommendation and ruling were that the ongoing child 
support is the right of the child and the proper procedure to enforce an attorney's lien it to 
bring a separate action against the client [R. at 281]. 
Appellee filed an Objection to the Commissioner's Recommendation on December 
12,2000 [R. at 199-239]. On August 24,2001, addressing the Appellee's Objection, the 
trial court ordered that the lien could not attach to ongoing child support but was a valid 
and enforceable statutory under Utah Code Annotated § 78-51-41 and attached to all 
property awarded to Nanette in the divorce, including past due child support [R. at 
297-299]. The State filed its Notice of Appeal on September 19, 2001 [R. at 300-301] and 
Appellee filed his Notice of Cross-Appeal on September 24, 2001 [R. at 308-309]. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about May 13,1998 Petitioner filed his Verified Complaint against the 
Respondent [R at 1 -11]. At that time the Petitioner and Respondent were involved in a 
bankruptcy proceeding [R. at 7, Tf20], the Respondent was earning approximately $3,000 
8 
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per year [R. at 22, f7], and the parties had essentially no property [R. at 33-37]. 
On or about June 18,1998, Respondent filed an Answer and Counterclaim [R. at 
20-23]. 
On or about August 5, 1999, Respondent executed a Legal Representation 
Agreement with Appellee, who had taken up Respondent case as her prior counsel had < 
withdrawn [ R. at 42, &171-172]. Paragraph No. 2 of such Legal Representation 
Agreement provides Appellee an attorney's lien on any property awarded or owned by 
Respondent whether related to the legal matter in which Respondent is involved [R. at 
171]. 
On or about September 22, 1999 in the divorce proceeding between Petitioner and 
Respondent, as a result of Appellee's efforts, the Third District Court entered an Order on 
Respondent's Verified Motion for Temporary Orders and Order on Petitioner's Motion 4 
for Order to Show Cause [R. at 103-108]. Such Order awards Respondent child support. 
On September 7, 2000 the court entered an Order for Intervention [R. at 129]. 
On or about October 28, 1999, as a result of Appellee's efforts, the court below 
entered a Child Support Order and Judgment [R. at 113-114]. Such Order and Judgment 
awards Respondent ongoing child support in the monthly amount of $562 and a judgment 4 
of child support arrearages against Petitioner in the principal amount of $ 10,304. 
On or about November 19,1999, Appellee provided the Office of Recovery 
Services, Appellant, Petitioner's legal counsel, and Respondent Notice of Appellee's 
attorney's lien [R. at 117-118]. Further, by letter dated December 15, 1999, addressed to 
4 
the Office of Recovery Services, among others, Respondent's counsel provided additional 
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notification of such Attorney's Lien [R. at 198]. 
On or about October 31, 2000, the Petitioner, Respondent, and their legal counsel 
executed a Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement [R. at 174-189], that in 
pertinent part provides: 
21. There currently exists a child support arrearage owed by the Petitioner 
to the Respondent in an amount indicated by the prior orders and judgments of this 
court or as it may have accrued during the pendency subsequent to the entry of any 
judgment. The State of Utah and the Office of Recovery Services shall continue 
to collect these arrearages, as well as any alimony provided for herein, and these 
amounts shall be paid over by the Office of Recovery Services to the 
Respondent's attorney until his attorney's lien has been fully satisfied. ... 
(Emphasis Added) [R. at 181]. 
Appellee has unsuccessfully attempted to collect his outstanding fees by repeatedly 
providing Respondent with regular monthly statements since the commencement of such legal 
representation, and demands for payment. Respondent has failed and refused to pay Appellee 
and terminated Appellee's legal services [R. at 200-201, f 6]. 
Since commencing the legal representation, Respondent has relocated to the states of 
Georgia, and presently is believed to reside in the state of Arizona. It is Appellee's opinion that 
it will not be feasible to bring a collection action against Respondent for his fees and the only 
asset of the marriage is the obligation to pay child support [R. at 201, f 7]. 
The Office of Recovery Services is collecting child support that was awarded to 
Respondent as a result of Appellee's efforts under a voluntary assignment [State's. Brief at Page 
8]. Between the period March 22, 2000 and August 28, 2001, a period of approximately 17 
months, the State paid Respondent the total amount of $13,994.50 [R. at 322 to 324]. Had the 
State only been paying Respondent the current amount of support then the State would have only 
10 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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paid Respondent the amount of $9,554. Thus, the State has been paying over arrearages of child 
support that it has collected to the Respondent in violation of the District Court's Order that 
Appellee attorney's lien attached to such arrearages. 
On February 15, 2001, Appellee filed a Motion for Order Allowing Withdrawal of 
Counsel [R. at 227] and on May 9,2001, the court entered an Order Allowing Withdrawal of 
Counsel [R. at 295]. 
At the May 9,2001, hearing of the Objection to Commissioner's Recommendation to Grant 
Motion to Quash Attorney's Lien, the District Court ruled that Appellee an attorney's lien for only 
$9,334.77, but denied the attachment of Appellee's attorney's lien for fees incurred relating to the 
defense of the State's Motion to Quash Appellee's Notice of Attorney's lien. Further, the District Court 
allowed Appellee's attorney's lien to attach to the child support arrearages, but not to the ongoing 
support [ R. at 297-299]. 
Appellant has filed an appeal of that order and Appellee has filed a cross-appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Eastmond v. Earl should not be overturned, as the State suggests, because it is the law. The 
attorney's lien in the instant case is based upon a contractual agreement between Appellee and 
Respondent as embodied in the Legal Representation Agreement and Stipulation and Property 
Settlement Agreement, and sanctioned by both statutory and established legal precedent from the Utah 
Supreme Court and this court, which this court should follow. While there is no question that children 
need to be supported, and parents need help collecting such child support, parties need to be represented 
in divorce proceeding by private attorneys, otherwise the task will fall to the State. 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-51-41 (1989), the Attorney's Lien Statute in effect at the time of 
Appellee's lien was filed, was replaced with Utah Code Annotated § 38-2-7 (2001) on April 30,2001. 
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Neither the prior Attorney's Lien Statute, nor does the present Attorney's Lien Statute mention that an 
attorney's lien may not attach to child support, whether past or the future proceeds. Further, this issue 
was considered by the Utah State Legislature when it redrafted and renumbered the Attorney's Lien 
Statute, and rejected. 
The State's argument that Appellee failed to inform the court in the prior Eastmond appeal that 
child support is exempt under Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(l)(a)(vi), or that the Utah Exemption Act was 
not considered by the court in deciding Eastmond is erroneous. Utah Exemption Act, which generally 
exempts certain classes of property such as child support from execution or attachment by general 
creditors, as no application to statutory or secured liens, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-10 (2) 
(1981). Without question, Appellee's attorney's lien is a statutory lien and child support is not beyond 
its reach. 
The State's argument that if Eastmond v. Earl is not overturned, the State "may be" sanctioned . 
for failure to comply with the federal laws for Title IV-D programs, is speculation and conjecture. 
Further, the State's supposed agreement with the federal government in Title IV-D program substantially 
interferes with the contract entered into between Appellee and Respondent in the Legal Representation 
Agreement and the agreement entered into between Appellee, Respondent, and Petitioner as embodied in 
the Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement, and thus constitutes a violation of the Contract 
Clause of the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 10, and the Constitution of Utah, Article I, 
Section 18. If Appellee is not paid from the child support being collected by the Office of Recovery 
Services, then he will not be paid at all, because Respondent has relocated, refuses to pay for the 
valuable services Appellee rendered, is essentially judgment proof, and the child support is essentially 
asset of the marriage between Respondent and Petitioner. If taken to an extreme the scenario might well 
develop that private legal counsel will not take on clients that have little or no means to pay for legal 
services, resulting in such people either going without legal representation, or the State having to 
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become involved in the divorce business. Clearly, inconsistent with public policy. 
It the state law that allows an attorney's lien to attach to child support, and if such state law 
conflicts with a deal the State made with the federal government, then it is up to the state legislature to 
determine whether to change such law, not the court. 
The District Court erred in determined that Appellee's attorney's lien did not attach to future 
child support as the Attorney's Lien Statute, applicable before and after Appellee gave notice of his 
attorney's lien, specifically allow attachment of such lien to proceeds, and the only thing that child 
support being paid to Respondent could be is proceeds. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Eastmondv. Earl should be followed and District Court's decision relating 
to the attachment of Appellee's attorney's lien to past child support should be 
affirmed. 
A. The law is that an attorney's lien attaches to child support 
and this law should be followed. 
The State cites Shipman v. City of New York Support Collection Unit, 703 N.Y.S.2d. 389 
(N.Y. 2000), for support the proposition that an attorney's lien could not attach to funds which 
had been collected by the support enforcement agency for that state. But such decision is based 
upon the rationale that "such funds were for the exclusive benefit for the infant child." Shipman 
at 394. However, as mentioned previously, this rationale was considered and rejected in 
Eastmond v. Earl. 
In Eastmond v. Earl, this Court addressed the issue of whether is would be against public 
policy to allow an attorney's lien to attach to child support and stated, 
The trial court also based summary judgment on the premise that it is 
against public policy to allow a contingent fee to be taken from child support as it 
is the child's right and not the right of the custodial parent. At least one 
jurisdiction has held that public policy forbids an attorney lien from taking 
13 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
any part of support paid for a child. See Fuqua v. Fuqua, 88 Wash. 2d 100, 558 
P.2d 801, 804 (Wash. 1977) (en banc). However, the Utah Supreme Court has 
expressly allowed an attorney lien to be satisfied from child support 
payments. Hampton v. Hampton, 85 Utah 338, 345-46, 39 P.2d 703, 706 (1935). 
Hampton involved a divorce action in which the trial court awarded the 
plaintiff a judgment of $ 60 per month for alimony and child support and $ 75 for 
attorney fees. Hampton, 39 P.2d at 704. The defendant paid the $ 60 monthly 
support payments through the court and the plaintiffs attorney withdrew $ 60 from 
the court for his fee by virtue of his attorney lien. The Utah Supreme Court 
upheld the attorney's withdrawal of the alimony and child support payment, 
holding an attorney lien "applies to all causes of action, judgments, and 
proceeds thereof in favor of an attorney's client. It makes no exception. It 
applies to all clients, regardless of wealth or poverty or needs." Id. at 706. 
(Emphasis Added)(Citations in Original). 
M a t 995-996. 
Thus, the issue of whether an attorney's lien may attach to child support has been 
considered by the Utah Supreme Court and under principals of vertical stare decisis it should be 
followed. 
B. Even under a horizontal stare decisis analysis an attorney's lien 
should attach to child support. 
Even if this court believes that it should scrutinize Eastmond v. Earl under a horizontal 
stare decisis standard, as the State argues in its Brief, then as admitted by the State in its Brief, 
Eastmond should only be overruled if the court is clearly convinced that the rule was originally 
erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing conditions and that more good than harm 
will come by departing from precedent. State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 (Utah 1994). 
Appellee argues that this is a heavy burden the State must prove. It is difficult, if not 
impossible, to show that Eastmond v. Earl was clearly erroneous as an attorney "...has a lien 
upon the client's cause of action or counterclaim, which attaches to any settlement, verdict, 
report, decision, or judgment in the client's favor and to the proceeds thereof in whosoever 
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hands they may come, and cannot be affected by any settlement between the parties before or 
after judgment..."(Utah Code Annotated § 78-51-41) (1989)(Emphasis Added). The Utah State 
Legislature has considered exempting child support from the pervasiveness of an attorney's lien 
but chose not to do so when it met and revised the Attorney Lien Statute which led to the present 
Utah Code Annotated § 38-2-7(2)(c)(2001), which similarly allows an attorney's lien to attach to 
"...any proceeds derived from the matter or action, whether or not the attorney is employed by 
the client at the time the settlement, verdict, report, decision, or judgment is obtained." 
Thus, the State has failed to meet the first test cited by the State in its Brief and Menzies, 
that the Eastmond v. Earl decision must be clearly erroneous. 
Whether more harm than good would come from following the Eastmond v. Earl decision 
is somewhat a subjective analysis. It is easy to say the child should receive that child support 
that is owed and such money should not be used to pay the attorney. Appellee is not at odds 
with the numerous cases cited by the State stand for the proposition it is necessity for child 
support to be paid generally, but these cases did not involve the issue of whether an attorney's 
lien should be honored out of such child support. None of the cases cited by the State for 
necessity of the support of the child were cited in Eastmond because they were not relevant. In 
fact in Eastmond v. Earl, at the trial court level the Honorable Roger Livingston invalidated the 
attorney's lien on the grounds that the support was the right of the child. This court's decision in 
Eastmond v. Earl overturned that trial court, ruling that, > 
The attorney lien statute applicable in this case is identical to that in Hampton. 
Because the Utah Supreme Court has allowed an attorney lien to be satisfied 
from a child support obligation, it follows that an attorney lien based upon a 
contingent fee agreement is permissible." 
Eastmond v. Earl at 996. (Emphasis Added)(Footnote and Citation Omitted). 
15 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Interestingly, Utah Code Annotated § 78-51-41 at issue in the case before the court, was 
nearly identical to the Attorney's Lien Statute in both Eastmond v. Earl and Hampton v. 
Hampton. 
Yes it is true that the parties' minor child may not have the benefit of the child support to 
the extent such money must first be paid over to the Appellee who represented the Respondent 
and established the right to such child support. But priority granted to costs of administration, 
such as attorney's fees, are generally recognized in many areas such as in bankruptcy, tax, 
probate and divorce areas of law. Otherwise, attorney's would be hesitant to take on case such 
as Respondent's out of fear on not being compensated, which could lead to attorney's declining 
to represent such individuals, such as Respondent who had no assets against which Appellee 
could rely upon to be paid out of other than the child support owed to Respondent. 
Even the Office of Recovery Services deducts a cost of administration when it collects 
child support prior to payment of the collected child support to the obligee, pursuant to 45 CFR 
302.33, although such fee is only between $7.00 to $15.00 per month. Thus, the attachment of 
the attorney's lien to the child support collected by the Office of Recovery Services and the 
requirement that such money be first paid over to the attorney having such lien is nothing more 
than the remittance of a cost of administration. 
C. The Utah Exemption Act is not applicable to an attorney's 
liens because such liens are statutory. 
The State next argues that Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(l)(a)(vi) supposedly creates an 
exemption from execution for "money or property received, and rights to receive money or 
property for child support." The State argues that such Exemption Statute prohibits the lien from 
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attaching to support, and that the Attorney's Lien Statute anticipated that such an exemption 
might arise when the Attorney's Lien Statute that states at the beginning that, "The 
compensation of an attorney and counselor for services is governed by agreement, express or 
implied, which is not restrained by law." The State argues the Exemption Statute specifically 
exempts child support from the attachment of a statutory attorney's lien. However, the State is 
guilty of failing to inform the court that the Exemption Statute carves out an exception for 
statutory liens, such as the attorney's lien before the court, and liens in the favor of secured 
creditors. Specifically, Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-10 (2) (1981), Allowable Claims Against 
Exempt Property, states, "This section does not affect the right to enforce any statutory lien 
or security interest in exempt property." (Emphasis Added). A portion of the Section 10 of the 
Utah Exemption Act was amended in 2001 to correct a misspelling only, but such amendment 
did not change the language of subsection 2. The Attorney's Lien Statute is just such a statutory 
lien. Thus, there does not exist the conflict that the State suggests between the Attorney's Lien 
Statute and the Utah Exemption Act 
D. The Contract Clause in the United States Constitution and the 
Constitution of Utah prevent the State from interfering with the 
Legal Representation Agreement between Respondent and 
Appellee. 
The State next argues that allowing an attorney's lien to attach to child support violates 
federal regulations, and more harm than good comes from following the Eastmond v. Earl 
decision because "Serious harm will occur, not only in the case at hand, but possibly to all 
recipients of federal IV-A funds if the prior ruling is not overturned." State's Brief at 13. 
Admittedly, the State of Utah elected to participate in Title IV-D of the Social Security 
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Act in 1975, and subsequent federal funding programs which it says are now supposedly in 
jeopardy if the State honors Appellee's attorney's lien. The State goes on to say it is worried 
about losing reimbursement by the federal government of 75 percent (later reduced to 66 
percent) of the administrative costs of running these programs if an attorney's lien is allowed to 
attach to the child support it is collecting. However, the State admits that "the decision whether 
or not to participate in the program was left to each individual state, but any state that desired to 
receive federal monies for AFDC benefits was required to submit and adhere to the state plan for 
compliance with the federal requirements." State's Brief at 18. However, the State has only 
offered conjecture and speculation to support its argument that it might lose such funding if it is 
required to honor the statutory attorney's lien. The State argues pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 654(b) 
that "money collected on behalf of a child who is not receiving public assistance is required to 
be sent to the custodial parent or guardian for the support of that child." Then the State comes 
up with the bold and sweeping statement that "Failure of a state to comply with federally 
mandated distribution can, and will, result in sanctions against the federal public assistance 
funds granted to the state." State's Brief at 20. However, the State fails to provide any support 
for this statement other than citing Hodges v. Shalala. 121 F. Supp. 2d 854, 860 (D.S.C.2000), 
where the State of South Carolina failed to comply with the requirement to have a computer 
system that met federal standards and was fined. However, the State cites no case what so ever 
to support the proposition that honoring a statutory attorney's lien would violate the federally 
funded program. To assume so amounts to nothing but conjecture and speculation. The 
supposed communication that the State refers to in its Brief from Office of Child Support 
Enforcement in Denver, Region 8, subsequent to the District Court's ruling upon which this 
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appeal is based to the effect that allowing an attorney's lien to attach to and redirect payment of 
child support or alimony that is being collected through the Office of Recovery Services would 
be considered non-compliance and will result in sanctions against our state Title IV-D funds, 
should not be considered as such supposed communication was not broug;ht up before the 
District Court hearing, not admitted into evidence, not subjected to cross-examination, is not a 
ruling from a court, and is unsubstantiated opinion evidence which the State attempts to have 
considered through the side door. However, even if there exists a risk that the state could lose 
federal funds by honoring Appellee's attorney lien, which this court should lightly accept, the 
State should not have the right to interfere with the contract between Appellee and Respondent. 
The State admittedly voluntarily entered into such federally funded program. To allow the State 
to quash Appellee's contractually established, statutorily sanction, judicially tested attorney's 
lien would amount to an interference with the Legal Representation Agreement, a contract 
between Appellee and Respondent, and the Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement, a 
contract between the parties and their counsel. Such interference would amount to a violation of 
the Contract Clause found in the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 10, as well as the 
Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 18. Thus, the State's argument in this regard must fail. 
E. The State should honor Appellee's attorney's lien regardless 
of whether public funds are use to collect such child support as 
the Attorney's Lien Statute specifically provides such lien 
attaches to such child support no matter in whose hands the 
child support comes. 
The State's next argues that public tax dollars should not be used to assist a private 
attorney in collecting a private debt. However, is not the collection of child support owed by an 
obliged parent to another parent itself a private debt which the State is collecting. Further, 
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Appellee is a tax paying citizen. The situation before the court involving the Respondent is not 
one where the State provided public assistance. Utah Code Ann. §78-51-41 (1989) states, in 
pertinent part, 
...The attorney who is so employed has a lien upon the client's cause of action or 
counterclaim, which attaches to any settlement, verdict, report, decision, or 
judgement in the client's favor and to the proceeds thereof in whosoever hands 
they may come, and cannot be affected by any settlement between the parties 
before or after judgement..(Emphasis Added). 
Even the recently enacted Utah Code Annotated § 38-2-7(7)(2001), in pertinent part 
states, 
Any person who takes an interest in any property, other than real property, 
that is subject to an attorney's lien with actual or constructive knowledge of the 
attorney's lien, takes his or her interest subject to the attorney's 
Hen...(Emphasis Added). 
Again, had the Utah State Legislature did not specifically exempt the payment of child 
support from the attachment of an attorney's lien. Other creditors do not have a statutory lien 
that Appellee has in this matter so the argument the State makes that a doctor or other creditors 
cannot take advantage of the States collection efforts is not only distinguishable but irrelevant. 
Appellee did not request the State to collect his attorney's fees, but believe the State 
should be subject to the Attorney's Lien Statute to the extent the State comes into possession of 
child support against which Appellee's lien attached, as anyone would. The State should not be 
allowed to pay out child support subject to Appellee's attorney's lien while thumbing its nose at 
Appellee's lien, as it clearly has done. 
Appellee's right to file a Notice of Attorney's Lien and pursue a judgment for its 
attorney's fees the State may wrongfully divert is addressed by the case of Lundy v. Cappuccio, 
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181 P. 165 (Utah 1919). In that case, Lundy's attorney named Ball obtained a judgment against 
Cappuccio, thus becoming entitled to an attorney's lien on the judgment, although such judgment 
was not for child support. Afterward, Messrs. Otis and Zetreauts won a judgment against Lundy 
and served a court ordered Writ of Garnishment on Cappuccio for the money he owed on 
Lundy's judgment. Lundy's attorney, Ball, warned Cappuccio that he had an attorney's lien on 
the judgment, and if Cappuccio paid it over to Otis and Zetreauts, he "would do so at his own 
peril." Id. at 167. The court ordered that Ball was entitled to collect from the judgment creditors 
Otis and Zetreauts or "to enforce the same against Defendant, Cappuccio." Id. at 168. 
While Lundy did not indicate that the judgment was for child support, it supports the 
concept that the attorney's lien attaches to the judgment and proceeds thereof "in whatsoever 
hands they may come." Id. at 167. The Utah Supreme Court in Lundy went on to say that the 
lien can only be lost by waiver or estoppel, neither of which was raised by the State. 
The validity of the factual underpinnings of Appellee's attorney's lien, at least with 
respect to child support that has accrued, are not an issue, and was not briefed by the State. In 
the instant case the District Court ruled that Appellee's attorney's lien was "a valid and 
enforceable statutory lien under Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-41, and shall attach to all property 
awarded the Respondent in the divorce proceeding, including past child support that has been 
reduced to judicial judgment or judgment by operation of law pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
45-9.3 (2000)." 
Such Ruling overruled the recommendation of the commissioner. The District Court's 
Ruling that counsel's attorney's lien does not attach to future or ongoing child support on the 
grounds that future child support belongs to the child of the parties, is the subject of Appellee' 
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Cross-appeal. 
Thus, to the extent the State comes into possession funds allocable to the past child 
support, then the State should be obligated to pay over such amounts to the Respondent, or to not 
do so at its own peril. 
However, as the past and future child support as the only asset of the marriage of 
Respondent and Petitioner, the State's collection of child support essentially frustrates, if not 
entirely prevents, the Appellee from collection of his attorney's fees. The Respondent should 
not be allowed to usurp the Appellee ability to collect his fees by merely assigning her right to 
collect child support to the State through the Office of Recovery Services. Respondent has 
relocated from the state of Utah, has filed bankruptcy, and is otherwise essentially judgment 
proof, except for the past judgment for child support and the future right to receive such child 
support. 
II. The District Court erred in determined that Appellee's attorney's lien did 
not attach to future child support as the Attorney's Lien Statute specifically 
allows attachment of such lien to proceeds, and the only thing that child 
support being paid to Respondent could be is proceeds. 
The Attorney's Lien Statute in effect in prior to April 30,2001, Utah Code Annotated § 
78-51-41, and the present Attorney's Lien Statute, Utah Code Annotated § 38-2-7, both 
specifically state that an attorney's lien attaches "proceeds", and say nothing about exempting 
child support for the attachment of the attorney's lien. It is impossible to argue that child 
support being paid under a child support order is anything other than such "proceeds". 
CONCLUSION 
The Eastmond v. Earl decision should not be overturned because it merely follows the 
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law as previously embodied in Utah Code Annotated § 78-51-41, and now Utah Code Annotated 
§ 38-2-7. If the law is going to be changed, then it should be changed by the Legislature and not 
by judicial fiat. Even if this court is going to consider restricting the ability of an attorney's lien 
to attach to child support, then it should not do so because the law it is not clearly erroneous. 
Further, the State's argument that more harm that good will come from following the Eastmond 
v. Earl decision because children will not be supported has been considered and rejected, and 
the State's argument that it may lose federal funding granted to it that it uses for the collection of 
child support is both to speculative and subjective for the court to use as a rationale. There are 
plenty of contrary arguments that more harm than good will result if the court overturns 
Eastmond v. Earl, including the possibility that less people with meager means having children 
will be represented by private legal counsel, resulting more children not being supported, or the 
government having to become more involved in the establishment of child support, a function 
now largely handled by private legal counsel, which could further result in all of societies' taxes 
increasing. Further, for the State to interfere with a contractually granted attorney's lien may 
well be a violation of the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 10, 
and the Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 18. 
While child support may be exempt from execution of general or unsecured creditors, it is 
specifically not exempt from and subject to statutory liens, such as Appellee's statutory 
attorney's lien. There exists no conflict between the Attorney's Lien Statute and the Utah 
Exemption Act, because of this exception relating to statutory liens. The language in the 
Attorney's Lien Statute that the State argues recognizes that attorney's liens are limited by other 
statutory provisions which restrain the lien by law, is no more than language implicit in any 
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statute or other law, and such language is not instructive because it does not specifically refer to 
child support as being exempt from an attorney's lien. Thus, with respect District Court's 
decision to uphold the attachment of Appellee's attorney's lien to child support that had accured, 
then the District Court's decision should be affirmed. 
However, the District Court did not follow the law when it granted the State's Motion to 
Quash Appellee's Notice of Attorney's Lien and restricted Appellee's attorney's lien from 
attaching to child support to be paid in the future. The District Court ruled this way on the 
rationale that such future child support belonged to the child. The District Court's rationale is 
not based upon the law, al biet emotionally appealing. Further, the argument that child support 
belongs to the child has been considered by this court, the Utah Supreme Court, and the Utah 
State Legislature. Both branches of government have refiised to adopt the idea that child support 
exclusively belongs to the child as basis for diverting from the present law. The Attorney's Lien 
Statute in effect in prior to April 30,2001, Utah Code Annotated § 78-51-41, and the present 
Attorney's Lien Statute, Utah Code Annotated § 38-2-7, both specifically state that an attorney's 
lien attaches "proceeds", and say nothing about exempting child support for the attachment of 
the attorney's lien. It is impossible to argue that child support being paid under a child support 
order is anything other than such "proceeds". Thus, the District Court's decision that Appellee's 
attorney's lien may not attach to such future child support, or proceeds, was at the very 
minimum a misreading or misapplication of the law, and this court should reverse the District 
Court's decision that erroneously restricted the attachment of Appellee's attorney's lien from 
applying to ongoing child support. 
Appellee Cross-appellant respectfully requests oral argument and a published opinion. 
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